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CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION:
PRESCRIPTIONS FOR A HEALTHY SUBDISCIPLINE
James K. A. Smith

Over the past decade there has been a burgeoning of work in philosophy
of religion that has drawn upon and been oriented by “continental” sources
in philosophy—associated with figures such as Martin Heidegger, Jacques
Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, Gilles Deleuze, and others.
This is a significant development and one that should be welcomed by the
community of Christian philosophers. However, in this dialogue piece I take
stock of the field of “continental philosophy of religion” and suggest that the
field is developing some un-healthy patterns and habits. The burden of the
paper is to suggest a prescription for the future health of this important field
by articulating six key practices that should characterize further scholarship
in continental philosophy of religion.

Plato is a friend, but truth is a greater friend.
—Husserl’s marginal comment in his personal copy of
Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit1

Over the past decade there has been a burgeoning of work in philosophy of
religion that has drawn upon and been oriented by “continental” sources
in philosophy—associated with figures such as Edmund Husserl, Martin
Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, Gilles
Deleuze, Gianni Vattimo, and many others. One could identify the rumbling of this thirty years ago in Jean-Luc Marion’s landmark work, L’idole
et la distance (1977) or in the earlier and influential work of Jewish philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas.2 In fact, elements of such “continental” (or more
specifically, phenomenological) engagements with religious phenomena
can already be seen in Husserl and Heidegger.3 In North America, this
1
See “Husserl’s Marginal Remarks in Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time,”
trans. Thomas Sheehan, in Edmund Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931) (Dordrecht: Kluwer,
1997), p. 270. Heidegger’s Being and Time was dedicated to Husserl.
2
For helpful discussion, see Jeffrey L. Kosky, Levinas and the Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001).
3
Rudolf Schmitz-Perrin notes the religious motivation behind Husserl’s phenomenology in “La phenomenology et ses marges religieuses: la correspondance
d’Edmund Husserl,” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 25 (1996), pp. 481–
488. For a helpful overview of the early Heidegger on these matters, see Merold
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continental impetus has generated a lively discourse and secondary literature. One might suggest that the 1997 publication of John D. Caputo’s The
Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida was something of a “coming out” party
for a field or sub-discipline sometimes referred to as “continental philosophy of religion”4—though such discourse had already been sustained in
the work of Robert Sokolowski, Merold Westphal, Carl Raschke, Adriaan
Peperzaak, Mark Taylor and others.5 And it has only continued to grow.
I think this is a significant development and one that should be welcomed by the community of Christian philosophers. Continental figures
provide unique theoretical frameworks and resources for “faith seeking
understanding”6 (not least because so many continental figures, such as
Heidegger and Levinas, were significantly shaped by religious imaginations, even if their relationship to religious institutions was tenuous).
There are important resonances, for instance, between the hermeneutic
tradition stemming from Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur and both
Westphal, “Heidegger’s ‘Theologische Jugendschriften,’” Research in Phenomenology
27 (1997), pp. 247–261.
4
I have no stake in defending this nomenclature, and grant that the category of
“continental” is contested. Nonetheless, I think the term has a heuristic value and
it has become a standard reference. See, for instance, Philip Goodchild, “Continental Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction,” in Rethinking Philosophy of Religion:
Approaches from Continental Philosophy, ed. Philip Goodchild (Bronx, NY: Fordham
University Press, 2002), pp. 1–39; Explorations in Contemporary Continental Philosophy of Religion, ed. Deane-Peter Baker and Patrick Maxwell (Dordrecht: Rodopi,
2003); Merold Westphal, “Continental Philosophy of Religion” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, ed. William J. Wainwright (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005), pp. 472–493; Self and Other: Essays in Continental Philosophy of Religion,
ed. Eugene Thomas Long (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007) [a reprint of International
Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 60, Nos. 1–3 (2006)]; and Nick Trakakis, “Meta-Philosophy of Religion: The Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy of Religion,” Ars Disputandi [http://www.ArsDisputandi.org] 7 (2007), esp. §§45–57. Cp.
also The Religious, Blackwell Readings in Continental Philosophy, ed. John D. Caputo
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).
5
John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion Without Religion (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997); Robert Sokolowski, Eucharistic Presence: A Study in the Theology of Disclosure (Washington, DC: Catholic
University of America Press, 1994); Merold Westphal, Overcoming Onto-Theology,
Perspectives in Continental Philosophy (Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press,
2001); Adriaan Peperzak, Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel
Levinas for Philosophy, Literature, and Religion (London: Routledge, 1995). Without
any hope of being comprehensive, one should also note the work of Carl Raschke,
Charles Winquist, Mark C. Taylor and many others. See particularly Deconstruction and Theology, ed. Raschke (New York: Crossroad, 1982) and idem., ed., New
Dimensions in Philosophical Theology (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1982). One might
argue, as Trakakis does (§46), that this flourishing of continental philosophy of
religion represents the materialization of what Merold Westphal called for in an
early essay, “Prolegomena To Any Future Philosophy of Religion Which Will Be
Able to Come Forth as Prophecy,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4
(1973), pp. 129–150.
6
Contra R. R. Reno, “Theology’s Continental Captivity,” First Things (April
2006), pp. 26–33.
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Catholic theological emphases on the role of tradition and Reformed epistemology’s emphasis on “control beliefs” that govern knowing. Or Husserl’s phenomenological framework provides helpful theoretical tools for
considerations of religious experience.7 And of late, voices in European
philosophy have turned their attention to specifically religious figures and
texts: from Derrida’s engagements with Kierkegaard and Augustine, to
Badiou’s and Agamben’s provocative readings of St. Paul.8
A scan of Faith and Philosophy or a skim of recent programs of the Society
for Christian Philosophers might not (yet) indicate this, but this growing
field has generated important alternative or specialized venues for scholarship and conversation.9 The Society for Continental Philosophy and Theology hosts stand-alone conferences and sessions in collaboration with the
APA, ACPA, and SPEP.10 In addition, the American Academy of Religion is
home to the Theology and Continental Philosophy Group. And meetings
of the Society of Christian Philosophers at both the APA and AAR have
been increasingly open to continental philosophy of religion. Work in continental philosophy of religion has appeared in leading (“mainstream”)
journals such as Faith and Philosophy and International Journal for Philosophy
of Religion,11 as well as journals such as Modern Theology and the Journal for
Cultural Theory and Religious Theory.12 There are also several book series
that have been primary venues for the field, particularly the Indiana Series
in Philosophy of Religion (edited by Merold Westphal), Fordham University Press’s “Perspectives in Continental Philosophy” Series (edited by
7
In addition to Otto’s classic work, The Idea of the Holy, cp. more recent proposals in this vein such as James K. A. Smith, Speech and Theology: Language and the
Logic of Incarnation (London: Routledge, 2002) and Anthony J. Steinbock, Phenomenology and Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2007).
8
Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1994); Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains: A Commentary on
the Letter to the Romans, trans. Patricia Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2005); Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. Ray Brassier
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).
9
Given that many programs which emphasize continental philosophy are
housed in Catholic universities, one expects something different from the American Catholic Philosophical Association and the American Catholic Philosophical
Quarterly. While both have long made room for phenomenology and existentialism, I don’t think either have been host to much work in what we’re calling
“continental philosophy of religion”—at least no more than the SCP and Faith
and Philosophy.
10
For more info see http://www.scptonline.org. The fruit of SCPT conferences
can be seen in books such as The Phenomenology of Prayer, ed. Bruce Ellis Benson
and Norman Wirzba (Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press, 2005) and Transforming Philosophy and Religion: Love’s Wisdom, ed. Norman Wirzba and Bruce Ellis Benson, Indiana Series in Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2008).
11
See Self and Other, ed. Long, for a selection of essays from IJPR.
12
The Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory has quickly become one of the primary hosts of conversations in continental philosophy of religion. It is published
at http://www.jcrt.org.
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John D. Caputo), and most recently, the Columbia University Press series,
“Insurrections: Critical Studies in Religion, Politics, and Culture” (edited
by Slavoj Žižek, Clayton Crockett, Creston Davis, Jeffrey W. Robbins).
Suffice it to say, continental philosophy of religion is a lively and growing field (one might be tempted to say “industry”). Furthermore, I think
the field of continental philosophy of religion has enough of a history—
and certainly enough momentum—that some critical reflection on “the
state of the field” is warranted. In this brief piece, intended to stimulate
dialogue, I want to briefly and selectively take stock of the field of continental philosophy of religion and suggest that the field is developing
some un-healthy patterns that threaten to compromise its viability as a
properly scholarly conversation. In particular, I worry that the field is becoming increasingly insular, reactionary, and (ironically13) monolithic.
The burden of this brief essay is to suggest a bit of a prescription for
the future health of this important field.14 This is offered as an essay, and
makes no claims to being comprehensive or exhaustive. Instead, it works
from impressions of certain trends in the field as seen from the perspective of one immersed in the conversation. It is offered in the spirit of dialogue. In particular, I will address six areas of concern; more specifically,
I will suggest that if continental philosophy of religion is to grow and
advance—and be heard at the larger philosophical table—it is imperative
that continental philosophers of religion develop six key habits or practices of scholarship.
1. Continental philosophers of religion should seek training and formation that
is rigorous, pluralistic, and rooted in the history of philosophy. The shape of
scholarship in continental philosophy of religion is, to some extent, an
effect of the training that continental philosophers of religion receive.
So if continental philosophy of religion exhibits worrisome patterns, we
do well to consider the formation and education of those working in the
field. That is, we need to carefully consider the shape of the “curriculum,”
so to speak. In this respect, I think that some of the worst habits that are
exhibited in continental philosophy of religion (insularity, a propensity to
retreat to enclaves, and an ironic hostility to difference and critique) are
to some extent products of graduate training that exhibit the same characteristics. Some continental philosophers of religion receive training in
departments of religious studies that lack rigorous structures of account13
I say “ironically” because so much of continental philosophy is taken with
the notion of “difference,” including continental philosophy of religion. And yet it
seems to me that much of what we get in the name of difference is just more of the
same; and in fact, the conversations tend to be inhospitable to approaches that call
into question the regnant paradigms.
14
In doing so, I don’t mean to take on the mantle of paternalistic physician
(to which critics will no doubt reply, “Heal thyself!”). I recognize that even suggesting this critique seems to put me in the position of someone who thinks they
have “authority” to speak to “the field.” In fact, I don’t presume such (I resisted
the temptation to title this “Advice to Continental Philosophers”!). Instead, as a
practitioner invested in the field, I want merely to offer an anecdotal diagnosis of
the field and suggest some practices in response. Both are offered in the spirit of
“conversation starters.”
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ability in philosophy, particularly the history of philosophy; the result can
sometimes be a kind of philosophy without accountability.15 Others (like
myself) are trained in philosophy programs that are exclusively “continental” and thus insulated from (and often hostile to) broader discussions
in (analytic) philosophy of religion. But it seems to me that philosophy of
religion will profit from structures and education that brings together the
resources and riches of both analytic and continental approaches. Granted,
I think this also entails some revised habits and practices in analytic philosophy of religion, which is de facto the majority culture in philosophy
of religion and which would do well to find in continental philosophy
of religion a partner in its work. But this should also be reciprocated:
those engaged in continental philosophy of religion should be looking
for training and formation that will enable them to engage philosophers
of religion more broadly This will require both learning a sort of “second
language” as well as a stance that sees analytic philosophy of religion as a
legitimate project (though not impervious to critique). Such collaboration
will not be well-served by caricatures or stereotypes from either side.16
And it seems to me that graduate school—a particularly intense period
of formation where deep-grained habits take hold—is the place to form
good, generous habits of collaboration and conversation. This requires an
environment, resources, and curriculum to sustain such formation.
I would suggest that continental philosophy of religion would be
strengthened and deepened if those seeking training in the field matriculated in graduate programs in philosophy that are intentionally pluralistic,
providing training not only in continental philosophy but also the history of
philosophy as well as the lingua franca of philosophy of religion today, which
will require training in analytic philosophy as well. Graduate formation will
be the first opportunity to enact study and conversation across the analyticcontinental divide. Those being formed in graduate programs of religion or
religious studies would do well to enter programs and departments which
have constructive relationships with philosophy departments.
15
I owe this phrase to my colleague Lee Hardy (who, admittedly, was discussing much of the work that happens in “theory” programs in literature).
16
For example, I don’t think it is constructive to denigrate logical or propositional analysis as such, even if continental philosophers of religion will worry
about a reductionism that sometimes attends such models. Consider, for instance,
this take on the situation from John D. Caputo: “The talk about God and religion in
contemporary continental philosophy bears almost no resemblance to what passes
for traditional ‘philosophy of religion.’ The latter has typically concerned itself
with offering proofs for the immortality of the soul and for the existence of God.
. . . This tradition, which goes back to the scholastic debates of the high middle
ages, is largely perpetuated today in the works of contemporary Anglo-American
philosophers, who offer the old wine of metaphysical theology in the new bottles
of analytic philosophy. . . . We on the continental side of this divide have sworn
off that sort of thing” (Caputo, “Introduction” to The Religious, 2). Construals of
the terrain in philosophy of religion such as John Caputo’s recent analysis are not
particularly conducive to the kind of collaboration I’m suggesting here. Nor are
they encouraged by the caricatures of postmodern thought proffered by, say, Alvin Plantinga in Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000),
pp. 422–437.
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2. Continental philosophers of religion should consistently submit their work to
the rigors of peer-review and re-value the journal article as a central arena for
discourse. Here my concern is the proliferation of edited volumes of essays
that increasingly seem to be the publishing venue of choice in continental
philosophy of religion.17 (And I say this as one who has both edited and
contributed to such collections.) While such edited volumes are published
by university presses and include important, constructive work, as can be
the case in any field, the process of peer-review for such volumes seems
to sometimes lack the same rigor and controls as journals.18 Instead, such
collections tend to be repetitions of the usual suspects—and also tend to
be quite predictable, merely new riffs on an established line. In addition,
the proliferation of edited volumes results in the loss of any “center of
gravity” for the conversation in continental philosophy of religion. Because discussions are sequestered in books, we lose the opportunity to
cultivate journals as “go-to” venues for ongoing conversations (as, for instance, Faith and Philosophy has ‘hosted’ ongoing discussions of Reformed
epistemology, Religious Studies has been the go-to venue for discussion of
miracles, etc.). Furthermore, edited volumes lack the opportunity for continuing a critical conversation that publication in peer-reviewed journals
offers. Continental philosophers of religion would serve the conversation
by submitting to the rigors (and frustrations!) of peer-reviewed, journalbased publishing.
3. Continental philosophers of religion should seek to publish their work in more
“mainstream” channels. One of the most detrimental trends in continental philosophy of religion is a set of habits that encourages “preaching to
the choir” (this is related to point 4 below). The field tends to retreat to
enclaves, setting up alternative societies and meetings and publishing in
“friendly” (read: “controlled”) venues. The result is a sectarian insularity:
continental philosophers of religion talk only to themselves. Granted, I
think the same is true in the majority culture of analytic philosophy of
17
See, for example, a number already cited (in notes 5 and 10) as well as PostSecular Philosophy: Between Philosophy and Theology, ed. Philip Blond (London:
Routledge, 1998); God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, ed. John D. Caputo and Michael
J. Scanlon (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999); Questioning God, ed.
John D. Caputo, Mark Dooley, and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 2001); Religion With/out Religion: The Prayers and Tears of John D.
Caputo, ed. James H. Olthuis (London: Routledge, 2002); Religious Experience and
the End of Metaphysics, ed. Jeffrey Bloechl (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 2003); The Experience of God: A Postmodern Response, ed. Kevin Hart and Barbara Wall (Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press, 2005); After God: Richard Kearney
and the Religious Turn in Continental Philosophy, ed. John Panteleimon Manoussakis
(Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press, 2006); and Transcendence and Phenomenology, ed. Conor Cunningham and Peter M. Candler, Jr. (London: SCM Press, 2007).
18
For instance, peer-review of edited volumes is almost never double-blind; furthermore, it is more easily commandeered by networks of nepotism. (It’s difficult
for me to be more specific about this without compromising the peer-review process.) That said, I have no illusions about peer-review as some kind of guarantee
for quality scholarship. Granted, analytic philosophy is not immune to problems
in this regard.
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religion, which is usually just as insulated from dissenting voices. The
result on both sides is a kind of tribal insularity. As a result, they often
encounter little resistance or critique—a state of affairs that is generally
detrimental to good scholarship. But equally importantly, by working and
publishing in such enclaves, continental philosophers of religion are also
missing opportunities to encounter, challenge, and contribute to broader
conversations in philosophy of religion.
By seeking to present their work in venues that are more broadly constituted (regional meetings of the Society of Christian Philosophers, the
Philosophy of Religion Section of the AAR, etc.), and by aiming to publish in more mainstream journals (such as Faith and Philosophy, Religious
Studies, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, etc.), continental
philosophers of religion will both open themselves to critique (which is
a scholarly virtue) and create opportunities to contribute to the field as a
whole (including the opportunity to critique regnant paradigms on their
own turf, rather than getting away with caricatured critiques within a safe
enclave that is little more than an echo chamber).19 This will require doing some translation work, relinquishing the ease and comfort of in-house
jargon, but without requiring that we relinquish the unique “genius” of
continental sources and traditions of inquiry.20
4. Continental philosophers of religion should move beyond the “essay” and take
responsibility for literature review as integral to their work. As a continental
philosopher of religion, I must confess to one facet of “analytic envy”: I
have been deeply impressed by the tight sense of the “state of the field”
that characterizes certain subfields of analytic philosophy. In particular, conversations in analytic philosophy always begin with a literature
review that considers the status quaestionis for a particular question or
problem. Every article must make an original contribution to the field,
and in order to make an original contribution it needs to (a) take account
of all earlier, relevant contributions and (b) make an argument that advances this contribution. Granted, for many philosophers this is standard
practice. But I have been struck by the common absence of such a practice
in continental philosophy of religion. In particular, “essays” in continental philosophy of religion offer “new” perspectives that often fail to take
19
My criticism of certain trends in continental philosophy of religion is by no
means intended to give a “free pass” to analytic philosophy of religion. Nor am I
suggesting that continental philosophy of religion would “get it right” if it would
just get in line with the analytic school. I have articulated a different critique of
trends in analytic philosophy of religion in James K. A. Smith, “Philosophy of
Religion Takes Practice: Liturgy as Source and Method in Philosophy of Religion,”
in Contemporary Practice and Method in Philosophy of Religion: New Essays, ed. David
Cheetham and Rolfe King (London: Continuum, 2008), pp. 133–147.
20
When I review (and, sadly, often reject) “continental” articles for various
philosophy of religion journals, I usually point authors to the work of Merold
Westphal as an exemplar of just what I’m describing here. For just two examples,
see Merold Westphal, “Taking Plantinga Seriously,” Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999),
pp. 173–181; and idem., “Christian Philosophers and the Copernican Revolution,”
in Christian Perspectives on Religious Knowledge, ed. C. Stephen Evans and Merold
Westphal (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), pp. 161–179.
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account of either (a) earlier contributions that make the same argument
or (b) earlier arguments that have already demonstrated the paucity or
faulty nature of the supposedly “new” contribution. Continental philosophy of religion could be revolutionized if we would just adopt the literature review as a standard procedure—and if the peer-review process
required this for publication.
5. Continental philosophers of religion should move beyond “victimhood” and
embrace critique. Continental philosophers of religion—like “continental
philosophers” in general—tend to construe certain types of criticism of
their work as a kind of persecution for their “continental” commitments.
As such, we tend to assume a “victim” mentality—which then drives our
retreat into insulated enclaves and the comfort of the choir. Granted, the
philosophical establishment in North America is governed by “analytic”
practices and assumptions. And I would also grant that, at times, this
does translate into biases and prejudices that ideologically reject continental discourse. However, not all critique is ideologically-driven; some
of it is philosophically warranted. And continental philosophers should
welcome that kind of critique, for it is philosophical critique that advances
the field.
6. Continental philosophy of religion should encourage authentic pluralism. Despite mantras of “difference,” I have been struck by a creeping hegemony
in contemporary continental philosophy of religion. The field has developed an oddly monolithic flavor—one that tends to be dominated by a
particular version of “religion” or spirituality that is allergic to the determinate religious institutions and traditions. In most cases this stems from
a certain Derridean understanding of “religion without religion,” but it
can also be informed by the work of Vattimo or others.21 Philosophies of
religion that would be more properly Catholic are almost ruled out of
court; indeed, they will be considered “unorthodox” vis-à-vis the regnant
orthodoxy of “religion without religion” or “secular” theology.22 But such
a narrow and monolithic construal of the field is debilitating for the con-

21
Other streams are developing, including work in philosophy of religion in dialogue with non-phenomenological figures such as Deleuze, Žižek, and Badiou.
22
For instance, nothing raises the hackles of continental philosophers of religion
more than Radical Orthodoxy. See, for instance, Clayton Crockett’s “Introduction”
to Religion and Violence in a Secular World, ed. Clayton Crockett (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 2006), pp. 10–13; John D. Caputo, “What Do I Love
When I Love My God? Deconstruction and Radical Orthodoxy,” in Questioning
God, ed. John D. Caputo, Michael Scanlon, and Mark Dooley (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), pp. 291–317, and the recent exchange between Elizabeth Castelli and Graham Ward in Journal of the American Academy of Religion 74
(2006), pp. 179–193. The one thing that is heterodox for continental philosophy of
religion is orthodoxy. I hope to elsewhere encourage a constructive dialogue on
this point. See also my concerns expressed in “The Logic of Incarnation: Towards
a Catholic Postmodernism,” in The Logic of Incarnation: James K. A. Smith’s Critique
of Postmodern Religion, ed. Neal DeRoo and Brian Lightbody (Eugene, OR: Wipf &
Stock, 2009), pp. 3–37.
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versation. Continental philosophers of religion should seek to encourage a
bigger tent and foster a genuine pluralism within the field.
My sense and hope is that the field of continental philosophy of religion is healthy enough to absorb critical discussion of our own habits and
practices. This dialogue essay is offered as a means to get the conversation started, with the hope and desire of strengthening an important field
within philosophy of religion.
Calvin College

